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ABSTRACT: Belgium is one of the Western European countries in which Muslims have reached more rele-
vance. The immigration process initiated in 1960s brought thousands of people from Turkey and from the 
Arab World to the major cities of the country. As consequence of their cultural and religious particularities 
Muslims were progressively claiming their own space in public life. Then, in the analysis of the Muslim po-
litical participation in Belgium two stages must be differentiated: The first one dominated by the delegates 
of the Arabs embassies; and the second one, when the Saudi influence decreased in 1990s giving rise to 
the emergence of other Islamic groups whose activities were totally involved with the real concerns of 
Muslims in Belgium. However, after several decades, the impact of the Islamic political activity is still low 
compared with the social presence of Muslims in the country.  
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1. Introduction:  
 
The current composition of Belgian society confirms the impact reached by Muslim commu-
nity in the last decades. According to recent studies, Muslims represent more than 5.8 percent 
of the population in the whole country (Gutierrez 2010). This percentage is more relevant in the 
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Region of Brussels where Muslims constitute a quarter of the population (Torrekens 2007). 
Nevertheless, focusing on the political impact of Muslims in Belgium, it would not be correct to 
identify its representatives according to their religious beliefs. Although the relevant presence 
of people whose religion is Islam, several circumstances prevent referring to Muslims as a ho-
mogeneous community at political level. Then, among Islamic believers are found many particu-
larities that determine their ideological position, leading voters to opt for one particular political 
tendency. 
Beyond the heterogeneous composition of Muslim community, since the 1960s it is possible 
to highlight actions carried out by groups acting according to an Islamic ethos whose conse-
quences have affected to the political life in Belgium (Meynen 2009). In this sense, the first evi-
dences of the Muslims’ political activities in the country were conducted by the embassy dele-
gates from Saudi Arabia. So, the negotiations established between Saudi representatives and 
the government remained far from the real claims of the majority of Muslim workers living in 
Belgium, and they were focused on foreign issues. (Dassetto 1990). The Saudi prominence al-
lowed its leaders to adopt the role of representatives of Islam, giving rise to a situation pro-
longed until 1990s when the government realized of the actual pluralism of Islam and the ne-
cessity of opening the participation to other Islamic groups.  
As consequence, the Saudi hegemony was fading, while began to emerge a new sentiment of 
islamophobia among Belgian society (Leman 2012, 69; Sant'Angelo 2005, 33) that caused the 
Muslim reaction and the appearance of various Islamic parties aimed to defend the presence of 
Islam in the political arena. The results obtained by the Islamic political parties in elections are 
still poor, but have marked the beginning of a new tendency not only in Belgium but in all Eu-
rope (Nielsen 2013). Actually, the majority of Muslims have preferred to vote for the traditional 
secular political parties, reflecting how the religion does not play a key role in the Muslim ten-
dency of vote.  
Hence, this paper aims at shedding light on the impact of Muslim religious beliefs in Belgium 
political life by demonstrating how when studying the Muslim community’s political behaviour 
the religious beliefs play a limited role. For this purpose, the work analyzes the political advoca-
cy of the most significant Muslim entities from the 1960s, and the low relevance reached by Po-
litical Islam (Bastenier and Dassetto 1985; Boubekeur 2007) in the country. I used for this pro-
pose several sources, the majority of them have been taken from the literature on Islam in Bel-
gium, but I have also used the information appeared in newspapers, together with my fieldwork 
after a period of research in Brussels in 2012 where I visited different Islamic centres and took 
part of the daily life of Muslims in Belgium. 
  
 
2. The Saudi influence and the representation of Islam in Belgium 
 
The political activity of Islamic groups in Belgium started in the 1960s, when Muslims stu-
dents supported by the embassies of Arab countries created a commission to set up a place of 
meeting for the Islamic community. The result of this initiative was the establishment in 1963 of 
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the Centre Islamique et Culturel de Belgique (Islamic and Cultural Centre of Belgium - CICB), in 
which was decisive the influence exercised by Saudi representatives (Landman 2002). The initial 
negotiations of this group with the government were aimed to obtain the assignment of the 
oriental pavilion located in the Cinquantenaire Park in Brussels (Dassetto 1990-2). In this regard, 
after a long period of negotiations, Belgian authorities agreed to the request made by the 
members of this entity, and in 1968, coinciding with the visit of the King of Saudi Arabia to Brus-
sels, Boudewijn, the King of Belgium, conceded the control of this building to the CICB. Once the 
Islamic Cultural Centre obtained the control over the oriental pavilion, the King Faisal goal was 
to transform the building in the Great Mosque of Brussels. As result of the Saudi influence, the 
CICB became the Muslim World League’s representative in Belgium, confirming the strategy 
traced by its leaders to extend the Wahhabi principles to Europe (Laurence and Vaisse 2006).  
Meanwhile, the Belgian government saw in the presence of Saudi representatives an excel-
lent opportunity to reinforce its relations with one of the most powerful country in the Persian 
Gulf (Nielsen 1992). This was the main reason to recognize the CICB as the only representative 
body of Muslims in Belgium (Leman and Renaerts, 1996). However, the goals of this entity were 
placed far from the real concerns of the majority of Muslims in Belgium, who in many cases re-
jected the Wahhabi principles spread from the Great Mosque.  
At this time, the migratory phenomenon extended in Western Europe brought to Belgium 
thousands of unskilled workers. The majority of them came from Morocco and Turkey, two 
countries where the Wahhabi ideology did not have great relevance; causing that many of these 
people did not feel identified with the Islamic Centre (Nielsen 1992). In fact, the presence of 
people from Saudi Arabia among Muslims in Europe is negligible, and the relevance given to 
Saudi representatives has no sense according to the real composition of Muslims inside the 
country (Bousetta, Gsir and Jacobs 2007).  
Nevertheless, the designation of CICB as representative body of Muslims in Belgium confirms 
the existence of various political interests, and places the entity far from the social problems. 
This situation led many people to refuse the hegemony of Saudi Arabia delegates (Dassetto 
2011) and to consider this institution unfit to solve the daily conflicts generated as consequence 
of the increase of Muslim population. However, the interest of Belgian government prevailed 
over the claims performed by a large part of Muslims, and the CICB continued for long time be-
ing the institutional reference of Islam in Belgium. 
Taking advantage of this situation, the policymakers tried to improve its relations with au-
thorities of Saudi Arabia and with the leaders of the rest of the Arab countries in order to give a 
new direction to its foreign policy and strengthen the commercial contacts in North Africa and 
the Middle East (Dassetto 2011). This strategy prompted Belgian politicians to accelerate their 
approach to Muslim representatives at local level and to begin the institutionalization process 
of Islam inside its borders. The aim of the government was to build alliances with the official 
representatives of the Arab states and to reinforce its international presence (Panafit 1997). 
Therefore, along with Saudi Arabia representatives, the presence of diplomatic delegates from 
several Muslim countries in the CICB (Dassetto, 2011) confirms the political essence of this or-
ganization and its concern toward international affairs.  
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The gap between social reality of Muslims and the political representation of Islam was simi-
lar in neighbouring countries, where the interference of foreign governments in local issues has 
been a fact in last decades. In France the Algerian government took the control over the Great 
Mosque of Paris (Cesari 2002), becoming the benchmark for the French authorities to negotiate 
matters relating to Islam in France. In Germany, the preponderance of Turks led the govern-
ment of Ankara to create in 1984 DITIB (Seufert 2004), an umbrella organization that tried to 
appear as a religious and institutional reference for Muslims in the country. Similarly in Great 
Britain the Saudis tried to lead the presence of Islam in Europe (Vidino 2010). 
Coming back to Belgium, the Islamic and Cultural Centre had a relevant activity in its early 
years. The rapprochement to Belgian government allowed this entity to be in permanent con-
tact with authorities and to establish the first steps toward the official recognition of Islam. This 
process of institutionalization found an important mainstay in the content of the Belgian Consti-
tution, guaranteeing the freedom of religion (Torrekens 2005) and eliminating all restrictions to 
practice Muslim worship. In this sense, in 1971, the government issued the first statement to 
regulate the situation of Muslims in Belgium as prelude to the law of 19 July 1974 which recog-
nized Islam as religion of the state.  
Meanwhile, the King Faisal’s decision to finance the renovation of the oriental pavilion con-
firmed the Saudi hegemony within CICB and the intention of its leaders to extend Wahhabi ide-
ology among Muslims in Belgium (Fadil 2012). Hence, the Saudi Arabia's economic contribution 
was decisive to the consecration of the project. This circumstance allowed the representatives 
of Muslim World League to take control over the Islamic and Cultural Centre. The presence of 
the MWLl was effective in 1978 when the Gran Mosque of Brussels initiated its activities and 
became in the main Islamic worship centre in the city (Kettani 1996). The mosque attracted a 
relevant sector of the Muslims living in Belgium who came to the temple looking for a place of 
meeting and prayer. The majority of these people remained far from the ideological Islamic 
trends, but the delegates of MWL focused their action on attracting them to spread their ideo-
logical principles (Landman 2002). 
Furthermore, the prominence reached by Saudi representatives reinforced their institutional 
position as interlocutors of the Muslim community. Consequently, the CICB not only monopo-
lized the main place of prayer, but also the teaching of Islam in schools (Mahi, 2005). As result 
of the absence of any organization able to represent the interest of all Muslims, the govern-
ment gave to CICB the role of hegemonic entity. Then, on February 20, 1978 was endorsed the 
deal (El Battiui and Kanmaz 2004) that granted to the Centre the task of appointing teachers of 
Islam in public schools and gave the CICB the financial management of the mosques (Bastenier 
and Dassetto 1985). 
Actually, the Wahhabi control over the education of Islam gave rise to an unfair situation that 
was denounced from several forums. In this regard, those groups of Muslims contraries to the 
hegemony of the CICB began to express their rejection toward the situation created by the gov-
ernment (Rath, Penninx,  Groenendijk and Meyer, 2001). This incipient confrontation led Bel-
gian authorities to observe the real circumstances around Muslim community and to realize the 
low social support reached by the Islamic Centre. The new scenario prompted rulers to seek a 
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renewed way to approach Islam, in which different groups and trends could have their own rep-
resentation. The first initiative was impelled by the Minister Jean Gol in 1985 (Furnemont 1997). 
He was the responsible for drafting a Royal Decree that set the stage for the creation of a "Con-
seil supérieur des musulmans de Belgique" (Supreme Council of Muslims of Belgium). However, 
the good intentions of the government failed to be implemented due to the constraints im-
posed by the Belgian Constitution regarding religious issues. These restrictions, addressed to 
preserve the secular state, prevented the approval of the document by the Council of the State 
(Renaerst and Manço 2000).  
The new initiative of the government to approach Islam did not only respond to the demands 
made by the majority of Muslims, but this change was also motivated by the growing gap 
emerged between the Belgian authorities and the leaders of the CICB. The proliferation of 
Wahhabi elements in Belgian schools (Merry 2007) caused a difficult situation for the authori-
ties because of the problems encountered to progress in the dialogue with this Islamic institu-
tion. Moreover, the pressure exerted by other Islamic groups forced the Belgian authorities to 
decide to open the political participation to the associations that for years had expressed their 
disagreement to the preponderance of the CICB. 
The government rapprochement towards Islam was endorsed years later as a result of sever-
al riots performed by Muslims in Europe. The impact of these events drove Muslims in Belgium 
to demand firmly their recognition as part of the European society. These actions started on 
April 1986 in Brussels with the demonstration that brought to the streets hundreds of Muslims 
condemning the attacks performed by American forces in Libya (Dassetto 1996). The massive 
presence of Muslims in these protests enabled Belgian authorities to observe the real dimen-
sion of the presence of Islam in Europe. This situation led them to confirm the suitability of fur-
ther the project started one year before, seeking to give voice to different Islamic groups exist-
ing in Belgium (Vandemeulebroucke 1990). The incidents were the turning point for other pro-
tests performed by Muslims in Europe, like the Rushdie affair and the issue of the veil in France.  
These mass demonstrations represented a clear change on the behaviour of Muslims in Europe 
who started to demand their rights as European citizens. 
Similarly to the process experienced in neighbouring countries, the growing presence of Mus-
lims in Belgium provoked the reaction from other sectors of the society which started to ex-
press their disagreement and their permanent rejection towards Islam (Zemni 2011). This re-
fusal resulted in confrontations that led to the appearance of a sentiment, knows today as is-
lamophobia, whose consequences were reflected in polls (Castaño 2012). In this regard, it 
should be noted the ascent experienced by the far-right party Vlaams Blok (Flemish Bloc) since 
the elections of 1991. Its nationalist discourse contrary to the presence of immigrants in Flan-
ders was accepted by those who consider the Muslim presence in Belgium as a menace for the 
stability of the country. This political party was banned in 2004 because of its racist and xeno-
phobic stance (Van den Wyngaert, 2006). However, its leaders established a new formation un-
der the name of Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest) with the same members, objectives and ide-
ology, only few days after the Ghent court forbade the activities of the party. The results ob-
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tained in the elections after the court decision succeeded in improving the percentage of votes 
obtained so far (Dowing 2011), reaching the 12% of the total votes in 2007. 
This conflictive situation caused the reaction of the rest of political forces, which since 1990s 
started to promote reforms in order to reinforce the institutional position of Muslims in Bel-
gium (Foblets and Overbeeke 2002). With these changes, the policymakers sought to confirm 
the presence of Muslims as a part of Belgian reality and prevent those radical political groups 
acting against the Islamic community. Among the amends undertaken by the government it 
must be emphasized the creation of the Centre for Equal Opportunities and the Fight against 
Racism on February 1993 (Visscher and Maiscocq 2007). This entity resumed the dialogue with 
the representatives of Islam in Belgium in order to establish a provisional Executive. Then, on 
November 7, 1994 the government recognized the interim Executive as the sole interlocutor to 
address all issues related to Islam. 
The new representative body adopted a configuration that tried to reflect the social compo-
sition of Islam in Belgium. For this purpose, authorities decided to establish a proportional dis-
tribution of the seats based on national origins. This structure gave a clear prominence to Mo-
roccans and Turks while the delegates of Saudi Arabia, who for years had acted as the only ref-
erence for the institutions, were placed in a secondary role (Renaerst and Manço 2000). Thanks 
to this agreement, the majority of Muslims accepted the provisional Executive, at the same time 
that this new entity was able to end with the interferences of Arab embassies (Renaerst and 
Manço 2000, 87). 
After four years, the good results obtained by the provisional Executive allowed the celebra-
tion of free elections within this body to create the definitive Muslim Executive of Belgium. It 
was established on December 13, 1998 and its official recognition took place five months later. 
Since this time, the Executive has been the sole representative of Islam, assuming the responsi-
bility of organizing the courses of Muslim religion at public schools, the training of imams, and 
the management of financial assistance for the mosques. Similarly, the Executive played a lead-
ing role as the highest authority in the certification process of halal products (Dassetto 2011), 
giving to MEB a relevant economic power. From the beginning, the control over halal products 
increased tensions between its members and the permanent confrontations have hampered 
the work inside the new institution. 
In this context of politicization of Islam, it is significant the low participation of groups close 
to Political Islam positions, although since the 1960s some evidences confirm the presence of 
entities linked to the Muslim Brotherhood ideology in Belgium (Maréchal 2010). However, the 
difficulties encountered by these associations to act together have relegated them to a marginal 
participation in the process of institutionalization of Islam (Esposito and Voll 2001). In contrast 
with others countries, the direct activity carried out by the Muslim World League in the country 
through CICB left the Muslim Brotherhood apart in the process of expanding the conservative 
principles of Islam in Belgium (Castaño 2013, 165). In neighbouring countries like Germany or 
France (Dassetto 1998) the MWL provided external funding to the Brotherhood representatives 
to reinforce their presence in social and political life. In contrast in the case of Belgium, this 
economical support was granted directly to the CICB, forcing Muslim Brotherhood's followers to 
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seek other sources of funding. On the other hand, the influence of Milli Görüs has been not very 
relevant in Belgium (Dassetto 2011), placing political Islam in a disadvantaged position com-
pared to other Islamic trends and the Arab embassies. Nevertheless, in recent years the signifi-
cance reached by the Islamist Moroccan parties have led the leaders of Justice and Spirituality, 
and the Justice and Development Party to expand its presence to Belgium, thanks to the pre-
ponderance of this nationality among Muslims. Yet, the action performed by these groups has 
been focused in foreign matters, showing low interest on internal issues of Islam in Belgium 
(Koutoubas, Vloeberghs and Yanasmayan 2009). 
The limited and scattered presence of local political Islam organizations in Belgium contrasts 
with the relevance obtained by supranational entities positioned in this ideological trend. These 
groups have decided to establish their headquarters in Brussels looking for their integration into 
European institutions. Thus, entities like FIOE and FEMYSO have achieved a prominent place, 
which has led them to become preferred partners for EU authorities (Castaño, 2014). At the 
same time, these supranational federations have exerted a decisive influence over the local Is-
lamist entities whose activities are focused on improving the situation of Muslims in Belgium. 
 
 
3. Political participation of Islam in Belgium 
 
The low popular support reached by political Islam has been reflected in polls where Islamic 
political parties have not obtained relevant impact (Portail Fédéral Belgique 2003). Nonetheless, 
the increasing influx of people from North Africa, especially from Morocco, and the significant 
presence of Turkish population in Belgium gave to Muslims a significant role in political arena 
since the 1990s. Then, in the last twenty five years Muslim representation in Parliament has en-
larged its percentages, but contrary to the desire of Islamic political parties, these deputies have 
been integrated into existing political structures in Belgium. This evidence confirms that reli-
gious beliefs do not determine political preferences. So, following the theory stated by Giulia 
Sandri and Nicolas De Decker; elements such as the socio-professional status or the educational 
level have wider relevance than religion to explain the political inclination of different Muslim 
groups in Belgium (Sandri and De Decker 2008). Therefore, the Muslims main support to the So-
cialist Party responds to the condition of workers and employees of a huge segment of Muslims. 
In contrast, other sectors decided to give their vote to the Humanist Democratic Centre (CDH) 
due to its roots in Christian democracy and the weight granted to the spiritual matters, alt-
hough the principles of this formation are away from the Islamic values. This situation proves 
that in many cases religion remain in a private sphere and corroborates the low political influ-
ence of the main Islamic ideological trends whose influences have remained in religious issues.  
At this point it is interesting to compare the political participation of Muslims in Belgium with 
the situation in countries like France, Great Britain or Germany.  In this regard, following the 
statement of Salima Bouyarden: there is not a specific “Muslim Vote” in Europe, although the 
attempts carried out by Islamic activism to establish Muslim Lobbies in different countries 
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(Bouyarden, 2013). Hence, the majority of Muslims in Europe opt for supporting the traditional 
parties and the impact of Muslims' political parties is not very significant (Didero 2013). 
The heterogeneous composition of Muslims in Belgium and the absence of a strong repre-
sentative organization of Islam have prevented the existence of a high ideological instance to 
influence the political decisions of the majority of Muslims, and to provide support for any polit-
ical party (Zibouth 2011). Even though the presence of Islam has caused important changes in 
the political life, this impact is still low compared with the real social influence reached by Mus-
lims, especially in the region of Brussels (Kovacs 2008). Nonetheless, since the late 1990s 
emerged in Belgium several small Islamic political parties whose programs were based on Islam-
ist principles. These parties did not hide their wish to implement an Islamist state ruled by Sha-
ria in Belgium. In many senses, the desire showed by these groups has been considered contra-
ry to the European democratic values and has generated a permanent debate around the politi-
cal legitimating of Islamic parties (Kelek 2012). Actually, this position is compatible with democ-
racy concepts because the leaders of these political parties do not try to impose their Islamic 
vision of life, but the aim of these formations is to persuade people and convince them of the 
need to evolve towards an Islamic society. Therefore, once Islamic parties have achieved their 
goal, the society should understand the benefits of the proposed system based on Islamic val-
ues. 
This approach raises many questions like: what is the model of state desired by these politi-
cal parties? Do these political forces want to change completely the democratic structure of the 
state? Are they seeking to adapt the current concept of democracy in their particular vision of 
life? In the first case, the ambitions of these groups are absolutely illegal and could lead to 
break the democratic balance of the country, giving rise to a new concept of the state different 
from what are considered the traditional European values (Arts and Halman 2004). The second 
possibility could be considered similar to the situation experienced by the Arab countries in re-
cent years, in which Islamist parties have tried to adapt their positions to the democratic princi-
ples. This compromise has reflected many ambiguities due to the contradictions between their 
public discourse and their ideological principles, as it has already been observed in Egypt (Kings-
lay and Chulov 2013). Despite of all, nowadays both possibilities are a utopia in Europe; never-
theless, if Muslims maintain the demographic growth registered in the last decades, this possi-
bility might become a challenge for Belgian authorities in the future. Actually, the support to 
political Islam among Muslims in Europe is not relevant; however, the proliferation of ghettos in 
Brussels and in other cities in Belgium together with the lack of opportunities for young people 
in these neighbourhoods might give rise to a situation in which Islamist groups could increase 
their presence in social and political life.  
In fact, the Islamist agenda defended by the Islamic political parties has been able to attract 
only a small sector of Muslims (Maréchal 2010). Islamic parties have obtained much lower re-
sults than they expected, confirming the  preference of the large majority of Muslims for the 
traditional political forces or even for the abstention. To understand this reality, it is necessary 
to observe the evolution of immigration in Belgium and the position adopted by the first immi-
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grants who considered it presence in Europe as temporary, refusing to be involved in the public 
life. 
This situation changed once immigrants were settling in Europe and forgot their initial wish 
to return to the homelands. Then, the family reunification initiated in 1970s led young Muslims 
to dilute their links with the countries of origin and to claim their rights as European citizens (El 
Asri and Maréchal 2013). Nevertheless, family tradition kept cultural influences imported from 
Muslim countries, allowing the consolidation of a European Islam, which currently is fighting for 
its recognition. In this sense, social and political participation has increased but not always in 
the same way. In recent years, Muslims had participated in public life but in each case following 
their own sentiments. Among the multiple expressions carried out by Muslims, some of them 
have decided to focus their activities on social matters, while others have chosen to participate 
in political arena. Sometimes this political implication has been performed in traditional political 
parties (Zibouh, 2011), but in parallel the Islamic sentiment has led people to establish political 
groups aimed to preserve the principles of Islam in Europe. 
The first Islamic party to appear in the political scene was Noor, founded in 1999 by Redou-
ane Ahrouch. The Ahrouch commitment towards Islamic values consented the rapprochement 
to the conservative Islamic groups in Belgium, among which were various members identified 
with the ideological movement of the Muslim Brotherhood (Maréchal, 2008) and other Islamist 
trends. So, the new party sought to offer an Islamic social and political alternative, far from the 
proposals made by secular Muslims who at this time began to take some relevance in the politi-
cal ground. In this sense, the program submitted by Noor defended some Islamic values (Das-
setto, 2011), which as has been mentioned above, presented some elements contraries to the 
Belgian Constitution. This position caused the emergence of a public debate about controversial 
issues like forced marriage or punishment by death that reached to damage the image of the 
Islamic party (Kern, 2013). These matters led to various sectors of the Belgian society to reject 
the presence of Islamic parties. Meanwhile, Noor continued extolling Islamic principles and con-
firming its ideological position, refusing the European lifestyles and condemning drugs and al-
cohol consumption. In addition, Noor tried to exalt the value of the family as the primary social 
nucleus (Koutoubas, Vloeberghs and Yanasmayan, 2009), attempting to offer an Islamic way of 
life to respond to the injustices caused by the materialistic and immoral European society (Ma-
réchal, 2010). 
Despite the social impact achieved by the party before the elections, the final support ob-
tained by Noor at the polls was only one thousand of votes (Portail Fédéral Belgique, 2003). The 
failure to attract the Muslim vote led the party to abandon the political forefront and to design 
a new strategy. The renewed approach did not seek attracting voters, but intended to place 
Muslims far from the traditional Belgian political forces. Following this performance, Noor car-
ried out the campaign: "ballots blank" for municipal and provincial elections in October 2000 
(Del Valle, 2002), showing its rejection to secular political groups. However, the defiant stance 
adopted by the Islamic party reduced the number of followers and caused a progressive weak-
ening that forced the formation to demise in 2007. 
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The poor results obtained by Noor were not an obstacle for Jean-François Bastin and Basam 
Ayashi to found a new Islamic party in 2003. The formation was called Parti de la citoyenneté et 
de la prospérité (Party of Citizenship and Prosperity - PCP). Bastin - better known as Abu Abdul-
lah Abdulaziz Bastin after his conversion to Islam -, tried to take advantage of the controversy 
created around the Islamic veil (D'Arripe, 2004) in some schools (Borloo and Dorzee, 2003) to 
appear as the main defender of the rights of Muslims in Belgium. In this regards and following 
the strategy initiated by Ahrouch, the founders of the PCP sought to adapt their Islamist dis-
course to the Belgium democratic values. With this moderate position the new political party 
managed to attract a relevant sector of Muslims who felt identified with the proposals made by 
the PCP (Maréchal, 2010). 
As consequence of the modest results obtained by Noor in the previous elections, the PCP 
presented a new line of action that tried to avoid addressing the controversial issues like those 
which had brought discredit to Noor. Basing on this conciliatory discourse, the PCP submitted its 
candidacy for legislative elections in 2003, where in an act of prudence, they only filed candi-
dates for the constituency of Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde. The results confirmed a significant im-
provement over previous elections. PCP obtained 8.258 votes which accounted for 0.13 percent 
of total participation (Portail Fédéral Belgique, 2003). Nevertheless, these results were far from 
the 3 percent expected before the polls. 
The PCP had based their hopes on the statement of a moderate speech aimed to achieve the 
support of the majority of Muslims in Belgium. This wish was complicated because of the diver-
sity in the composition of Islamic community. In turn, the leaders of the party looked for the 
recognition of Islamic values among Belgian authorities and the rest of the society, defending 
the integration in the democratic system, and showing its rejection towards the use of violence 
for political or ideological purposes (Dassetto, 2011). 
Despite these encouraging results obtained by the Islamic formation, the percentage of votes 
achieved was not enough to get representation in the Parliament (Maréchal, 2010). This failure 
gave rise to an internal dissent causing a clash between Ayashi and Bastin in order to establish 
the political position for the next elections. The Franco-Syrian cleric (Bloom, 2011) proposed to 
change the moderate line defended by Bastin and elaborate a new program in which the party 
showed its commitment towards those controversial matters avoided in first instance. The con-
flict led Bastin to abandon the party, which after his resign went into serious decline (Hugues, 
2004). This weakness was confirmed shortly afterwards in Brussels regional elections where the 
PCP reached a poor result. 
Nevertheless, Bastin did not resign to continue with his political project, and decided to es-
tablish the Parti des jeunes musulmans (Muslim Youth Party - PJM). The new formation ap-
peared as competitor of PCP and managed to attract a significant percentage of Islamic votes 
that allowed the PJM overtake its rival by over 2,000 votes. The electoral result confirmed the 
relevant role of Bastin and his influence over an important segment of Muslims in Belgium. 
Meanwhile, the victory of Muslim Youth Party tipped the balance towards moderate positions, 
leaving the PCP in a delicate situation that would lead to its downfall (Dassetto, 2011). 
Sergio Castaño Riaño, The Political Influence of Islam in Belgium  
 
143 
 
The composition of this Islamic party founded by Jean-François Bastin Abdulla in 2004 re-
flects the permanent links with the representatives of political Islam in Belgium (Koksal, 2006). 
However, the PJM tried to attract the attention of the whole Muslim community through the 
adoption of a provocative speech that reached an important impact in media. The controversial 
discourse elaborate by Bastin led him to express in various occasions his desire to move to-
wards the social and political Islamization (Maréchal, 2010). Nevertheless, Bastin was aware of 
the social environment in which he was living, and his pragmatism made him to realize of the 
impossibility to advance in his proposal at this time. So, as Bastin asserts; "it will be reached 
when God decides" (Koutoubas, Vloeberghs and Yanasmayan, 2009). 
Analyzing the discourse of Bastin, it is noteworthy the presence of many elements that could 
lead to identify it with the ideological positions of the most relevant Islamist trends like the 
Muslim Brotherhoods or Milli Görüs. The difference between Bastin and the groups integrated 
in these international movements is: while Bastin expresses in public his desires to advance in 
the global Islamization, the majority of the Islamist entities try to use a double speak that hide 
their real ambitions (Vidino, 2010; Fourest, 2004). Precisely the direct statement of its program 
and the absence of a double discourse in the PJM could be the reason of its poor electoral re-
sults on 2007, where the group of Bastin got 0.07 of the national vote, down from 0.13 obtained 
by PCP in 2003 (Portail Fédéral, 2007). The electoral defeat did not impeded to the Islamic polit-
ical party to achieve a relevant position in media, adopting in some cases the role of representa-
tive of Muslims in Belgium. 
Besides the aforementioned political parties, it is necessary to highlight the activity carried 
out by the Arab European League since February 2000. This entity was founded by Dyab Abou 
Jahjah (Simons, 2003), a Lebanese close to Hezbollah (Maréchal, 2010). Originally, the organiza-
tion adopted the named Al Rabita ASBL, and its leaders tried to follow a similar strategy to that 
used by the Muslim Association of Britain in UK, seeking to become the main defender of the 
Palestinian Cause. The action of this group began with the complaint against Israeli Prime Minis-
ter Ariel Sharon which together with the demonstration in Antwerp gave to this organization a 
high social and political significance (Chu, 2002).   
However, the activity carried out by Abou Jahjah was not limit to the Palestinian issue. The 
Lebanese tried to be present in all matters related to Muslims; Jahja has been especially critical 
of the controversy emerged around the use of Islamic veil in Belgium, adopting the attitude that 
had allowed the Union of Islamic Organizations in France (UOIF) to take a significant role in the 
institutionalization of Islam (Venner, 2005). In this regard, as a measure to increase its presence 
in the public arena, the Arab European League established in 2003 a political alliance with the 
Parti du Travail de Belgique (Working Party Belgium – PTB) for the legislative elections, creating 
the coalition Resist (Koutoubas, Vloeberghs and Yanasmayan, 2009). This political party man-
aged to obtain more than ten thousand of votes, reaching 0.15 percent of the total national 
electorate. Nonetheless, the popular support obtained by Resist provoked the authorities began 
to control the actions of Abou Jahjah, whose ties to Hezbollah and other extremist organizations 
were on the edge of legality (Planchar, 2003). This situation led the government to prepare the 
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dissolution of this formation in 2007, and the organization was finally settled on October 21, 
2010. 
Among the positions defended by Islamist political parties in Belgium, it should pay attention 
to the attitude adopted by the PJM regarding its commitment on Islamization in Europe. This 
subject had been treated by the ideological leader of the Muslim Brotherhood Yusuf al-
Qaradawi (Qaradawi, 1992), who due to the impossibility of evolve towards Islamization in con-
temporary Europe, called for the creation of a parallel society in which Muslims could live ac-
cording to Islamic law (Vidino, 2006). Inspired in the statement of Qaradawi, Bastin tried to es-
tablish in Belgium the suitable frame to provide Muslims a space to develop their own struc-
tures (Maréchal, 2010). 
Finally, and after several attempts to situate Islamic parties in political arena, the Islam Party, 
the last political venture headed by Redouane Ahrouch, has achieved the success in local elec-
tions, placing one representative in Molenbeek another in Anderlecht in 2012 (Torrekens, 
2012). Islam Party ran candidates in three municipalities and obtained a total support of 5150 
votes: 1939 in Anderlecht, 1833 in Brussels-Vile, and 1478 in Molenbeek. Although the new per-
formance of Islam Party, Ahrouch admits continuity in his political project and asserts: "The 
agenda is still the same, but our approach is different now. I think we have to sensitize people, 
make them understand the advantages to having Islamic people and Islamic laws. And then it 
will be completely natural to have Islamic laws and we will become an Islamic state (RTBF, 
2012)". Therefore, the Islam Party has achieved 4,1% of the votes in Anderlecht and Molenbeek 
but in Brussels-Capital the support was not enough to situate a representative in the Council. 
The leaders of this new Islamic party seek to present themselves as a reference for all Muslims, 
overcoming the ethnical, national and ideological aspects that for long time have distanced 
members of the Islamic community in Belgium. In this sense, and following the strategy per-
formed by the PJM, they avoided to include the term Arab in its name, trying to approach to 
people from Turkish origin committed to Islamist values. However, the majority of the followers 
of Islamists parties in Belgium come from Morocco and they have remained distanced from the 
Turkish community so far. 
Analyzing the electoral result, the question is: who supports these Islamic political parties? 
According to Abigail R. Esman, the Islamist parties are not the real threat but people who sup-
port them and chose their candidates as representatives in local councils (Esman, 2012). The 
Islam Party has maintained the line of action of the PJM, appearing as the political party for all 
Muslims. One of the elements used to attract followers has been the situation of exclusion lived 
for a big segment of Muslims in Europe, attributed in some cases to the colonial legacy. The cur-
rent situation in various municipalities of Brussels like Molenbeek and Anderlech favours the 
spread of a message commitment with the situation of these inhabitants. In this sense it should 
be emphasized the role adopted by young people who constitute more than a third part of the 
population. In many instances, the lack of opportunities led them to support radical Islamic 
groups as way to complaint for their unfair situation (Israeli, 2009). Thus, according to Hind 
Fraihi: “a separate Muslim state is grown and where Belgium feels sometimes so far away” 
(Jenkins, 2007). This assertion complement the statement of Bruce Bawer considering that 
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many Muslims observe Molenbeek no as part of Belgium, but as a space under Islamic law in 
which the rest of Belgian people is not welcome (Jenkins, 2007). Although the situation is im-
proving in recent years, the access to education and laboral market is still low. For this reason 
the economic situation of this social group causes discrimination (Fadil, 2012).   
On the other hand, the descendants of the first immigrants refuse to follow the same path of 
their parents who had to perform jobs in worse conditions than the rest of the society 
(Scheiffer, 2011). New generations struggle for the recognition of an Islamic identity inside Bel-
gium. For this purpose, they have displayed greater activism trying to overcome the action initi-
ated by their parents. At present time, they want to intensify the actions performance by reli-
gious associations, adding to these entities a relevant political activity. In some cases, this new 
approach led their members to support the Islamic political parties. Hence, young Belgian Mus-
lims are more involved in political matters, leaving in a secondary position their commitment 
with the religious associations. However, the experience lived in Molenbeek and Anderlecht 
cannot be extended to the rest of the cities in Belgium (Israeli, 2009) where, as I stated above, 
Muslims constitute a heterogeneous community supporting several ideological positions. There-
fore, apart from these two municipalities in Brussels, Islamist parties find a low support among 
Belgian society, who normally observe this kind of political parties as radicals, and consider their 
discourse far from the reality of contemporary Belgium. Besides, the followers of PJM and Islam 
Party come from those social sectors that reject Western democracies and feel themselves dis-
criminated by the majority of Belgians (Euroislam.info).  
In sum, although several groups have tried to appear in Belgium political scene, their impact 
is still reduced. The Islamic political program has failed to attract the majority of Muslims who 
have chosen to confer their votes to the conventional Belgium parties. 
 
 
4. Conclusions  
 
 The demographic studies so far confirm the increase of Muslim population and their active 
presence in social and political life in Belgium. However, this social impact has not been reflect-
ed in political arena where Islamic groups have not obtained the expected results. In this sense, 
it can be observed how Muslims have reached more relevance in media than in electoral pro-
cesses in which the Islamic political parties have played a secondary role. This fact confirms 
how, despite the large numbers of Muslims living in Belgium, only few of them vote according 
to their religion. Likewise, it is remarkable that Muslim is not synonymous of Islamist, then Islam 
is understood in different ways and in most of cases the religious beliefs remain in the private 
sphere. Therefore, religion do not determine the political will of the citizens, and among Mus-
lims there are people who opt by left or right parties, ecologist, nationalists, Islamists and fol-
lowers of other ideological trends.  
Although at present time Islamic parties are not in Parliament, since the ‘60s it is observed a 
clear political influence of Islam in Belgium whose effects have had consequences both on for-
eign policy, as well as in local issues. The activities of Islamic groups allowed improving the ex-
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ternal relations of the Belgian government with the Arab countries. On the contrary, the social 
presence of Muslims helped to the emergence of right wing extremist groups, and the subse-
quent appearance of Islamic political groups that tried to defend the Muslims positions in social 
and political life. In addition, some political parties have amended its electoral programs in or-
der to attract Muslims. Hence, beyond the impact reached by Islamic parties in Belgium, the in-
direct pressures exerted by different Muslims groups have achieved to modify several aspects 
of the political life in the country, confirming the beginning of a process that could be more in-
tensive in the future. 
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